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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction over this matter pursuant to Utah Code Ann.
§ 78-2a-3(2)(f) (1995).

STATEMENT OF ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW
1.

Issue: Did the appellant present sufficient evidence to establish his indigency?
Standard of review: In determining indigency, the "underlying empirical facts regarding

the claim of indigency are reviewable for clear error; the conclusion as to whether those facts
qualify the defendant as indigent is reviewable for correctness." State v. Vincent, 883 P.2d 278,
282 (Utah 1994).
2.

Issue: Did the appellant's failure to avail himself of his remedies under Rule 16, Utah

Rules of Criminal Procedure, when the City was unintentionally tardy in providing him with
timely discovery, waive any claim on appeal?
Standard of review: Absent a demonstrated Due Process violation, this Court will review
this issue under an abuse of discretion standard. See State v. Rugebregt, 965 P.2d 518, 522,
(Utah App. 1998). Further, a trial court's error will only be reversed if this Court is persuaded
that absent the error, there is a reasonable likelihood of a more favorable result for the defendant.
See Salt Lake City v. Reynolds, 849 P.2d 582, 585 (Utah App. 1993).
3.

Issue: Did the City properly cross-examine appellant's witnesses in accordance with Rule

405 of the Utah Rules of Evidence?

1

Standard of review: Improper statements will require reversal if they are determined to
be harmful. An error is harmful if there is a reasonable likelihood of a more favorable outcome
without the error. See State v. Palmer, 860 P.2d 339, 342 (Utah App. 1993) cert, denied., 868
P.2d 95 (Utah 1993).

DETERMINATIVE STATUTES AND RULES
Utah Code Ann. §78-2a-3(2)(f) (1995)
Utah R. Crim. P. 16
Utah R. Evid. 404
Utah R.Evid. 405

NATURE AND COURSE OF THE PROCEEDINGS
The City agrees with appellant's recitation of the nature and course of the proceedings as
stated in their brief. See Appellant's brief at 4-5.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
In October 1997, Ms. Patricia Joan Leach, (hereinafter referred to as "Ms. Leach"),
became the manager at Lakeview Manor apartments in the city of Orem, Utah County, Utah.
Appellant, Travis Bergstrom, (hereinafter referred to as "appellant"), was a tenant at the
apartment complex at that time. Ms. Leach had numerous problems with appellant. The first
involved a complaint of loud music from appellant's apartment. R. at 59 (Tr. at 6). When
confronted about the music, appellant responded "very belligerently." Id.
2

Ms. Leach also reported an incident when the appellant and two of his friends got over
the fence to the apartment swimming pool, and threw cinder blocks into the ice-covered
swimming pool. R. at 59 (Tr. at 7). Again, Ms. Leach confronted the appellant about his
inappropriate behavior and received a "very hostile, very belligerent" response. Id. For these
types of incidents, Ms. Leach had the option of "fining or evicting or even issuing a written
warning" but on both occasions, she merely gave appellant a verbal warning. R. at 59 (Tr. at 6,
7).
After Ms. Leach warned appellant about his violations of apartment rules, appellant
began directly antagonizing Ms. Leach. On December 10, 1997, Ms. Leach was in the
community laundry room when she noticed a "red dot on [her] chest." R. at 59 (Tr. at 8). She
recognized it as a dot from a laser pointer, looked up and saw the appellant standing
approximately six to ten feet away. Id. She reports feeling very nervous as a result of seeing the
laser dot. Id. She confronted the appellant about the laser. The appellant then responded that
"he had a laser scope, that he was a sniper, and that he had killed many people." R. at 59 (Tr. at
9). At that point, Ms. Leach felt "threatened." Id.
A few days later, Ms. Leach again noticed a laser dot on her chest while in the laundry
room. R. at 59 (Tr. at 10). This time, appellant and two friends were walking outside the
laundry room and pointed the laser at Ms. Leach. Id. She again felt threatened and thought the
appellant was "crazy." Id.
On an evening sometime near the end of December, 1997, Ms. Leach was sitting in her
first-floor apartment watching television when suddenly a bright white light was focused on her
from outside her apartment. R. at 59 (Tr. at 11). When she moved out of the light and looked
3

out her window, she saw the appellant on his third-floor balcony shining the light down towards
her apartment. R. at 59 (Tr. at 11, 12). Ms. Leach testified that she felt upset, threatened and
frightened. Id.
In late December, Ms. Leach again became the victim of appellant's disturbing and
potentially dangerous behavior. Ms. Leach opened her door one morning and noticed a one foot
by two foot accumulation of ice directly in front of her door. R. at 59 (Tr. at 13). She testified
that there had never been, prior to this incident nor subsequent to this incident, a drip or leak
directly over her door that would cause ice to accumulate in front of her door. R. at 59 (Tr. at
14).

She was later told by a tenant, where the ice had come from. R. at 59 (Tr. at 16).
Jason Cameron (hereinafter referred to as "Cameron") testified that he was aware of the

ice patch in front of Ms. Leach's apartment as he had slipped on the ice. R. at 59 (Tr. at 22,23).
After slipping, Cameron then went to the appellant's apartment and made a comment about the
ice. At that time, the appellant admitted to deliberately pouring water in front of Ms. Leach's
apartment so that "maybe she'd come outside and break her neck." Id.
Finally, Ms. Leach's car was egged on or about January 1,1998. R. at 59 (Tr. at 13).
Appellant admitted that he owned a sniper rifle. R. at 59 (Tr. at 46,47). While not
admitting to directly pointing the laser at Ms. Leach he conceded that maybe she saw the laser
dot on her chest. He stated that, "If I did it [sic] it was in the process of going across from maybe
Mr. Edwards' apartment to Mr. Cutler's apartment. R. at 59 (Tr. at 45).
Appellant was evicted from his apartment on January 1,1998. R. at 59 (Tr. at 16).
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SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
Whatever errors may have been committed during the course of the proceedings at the
trial court level, none of the errors, individually or combined, warrant a new trial. While the
court may have neglected to ask the appellant a series of questions regarding his financial
situation, the appellant failed to prove to the court that he was in fact indigent. Further, while the
City of Orem (hereinafter referred to as "the City") acknowledges that due to a clerical error,
appellant did not receive his requested discovery in a timely manner, appellant failed to object at
trial or request any relief from the trial court. Additionally, appellant has not offered any
evidence that he was prejudiced. Finally, the City acted appropriately and was within the scope
of the Rules of Evidence when cross-examining appellant's witnesses regarding their opinion as
to the appellant's reputation for peacefulness. Because appellant chose not to familiarize himself
with the rules governing the trial proceeding, he failed to object to certain procedural errors. By
failing to object to those errors, appellant waived any right to appeal those errors. Appellant
should not be granted a new trial.

ARGUMENT
I.

APPELLANT FAILED TO ESTABLISH THAT HE WAS IN FACT INDIGENT.
Appellant's entire argument regarding the issue of the appointment of counsel presumes

that appellant was in fact indigent when he requested public counsel of the trial court. There
never was nor has there been, any evidence presented to the court to support such a request. At
the appellant's arraignment, the appellant requested information about receiving a public
defender, claiming he couldn't afford an attorney. R. at 50 (Tr. at 5-6). While the court may
5

have neglected to conduct an in-depth inquiry as to the appellant's financial status on the record,
such neglect does not warrant this appeal, nor did it create an injustice. "The defendant[ ] bear[s]
the initial burden of establishing [his] indigency." State v. Vincent, 883 P.2d 278, 283, (Utah
1994). Appellant must establish that hiring counsel would place an undue hardship on his ability
to provide the basic necessities of life for himself. See Id. Appellant failed to carry his burden.
Merely stating that one cannot afford an attorney is hardly proof of indigency. Most people,
when faced with legal proceedings, feel they cannot afford an attorney but would hardly qualify
as indigent. Based on a singular and unsubstantiated request for counsel, appellant would have
this Court believe that he was indigent and that the trial court, somehow erred by failing to
appoint counsel.
At arraignment, when there are dozens of people waiting to appear, the court cannot be
expected to spend the time necessary to conduct an in-depth analysis of every defendant's
financial situation. For this reason, the court assists defendants in carrying their burden of
proving indigency by providing an "Affidavit of Indigency", See Addendum 1. This document
requests detailed information regarding a defendant's sources of income, ownership of property,
defendant's debts, monthly expenses and dependents. While the judge denied the appellant's incourt request for counsel, the court did nothing to prevent the appellant from inquiring about an
alternative way to prove his indigency. Neither did the court prevent the appellant from
completing and filing an Affidavit of Indigency and requesting the court to reexamine its
decision.
Finally, it is curious to note that appellant is claiming that he was indigent on his trial date
of June 8, 1998 but was able to retain counsel, who made an appearance within sixteen days of
6

appellant's conviction, to assist him with his post-trial proceedings as well as his appeal. R. at
13-14.
In reviewing whether the trial court erred by failing to appoint counsel, the Court reviews
the underlying facts for clear error. See State in Interest of W.B.J., 966 P.2d 295, 296 (Utah App.
1998) citing State v. Pena, 869 P.2d 932, 937-38 (Utah 1994). The conclusion as to whether
those facts qualify the defendant as indigent are then, reviewable for correctness. Finally, the
degree of discretion the "legal standard for indigency bestow on trial Courts . . . [is] a rather
broad pasture for trial judges applying the law of indigency to the facts before them." Id. All the
trial judge had before him was a statement that appellant could not afford to hire an attorney.
Appellant stated to the judge that he was 30-years old and that he worked. He provided no
further information to the Court, either during or after the hearing with which to determine his
indigency. It should not be surprising to the appellant that his request for counsel was denied,
when the only information he offered the judge to determine indigency was that appellant was an
adult, working male. Such information would intuitively contradict a showing of indigency and
support the judge's decision to deny counsel. Notwithstanding, appellant was, at no time, barred
by the Court from proving his indigency via "affidavit." If in fact the appellant was not indigent,
the Court's neglect in probing into appellant's financial status was not clearly erroneous.
Appellant bears the burden of proving his indigency. See Vincent at 283. He failed to do so.
Therefore the Court did not commit clear error and was correct in denying appellant's request for
counsel.
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H.

APPELLANT FAILED TO AVAIL HIMSELF OF HIS REMEDIES UNDER
RULE 16, UTAH RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE, WHEN HE DID NOT
RECEIVE HIS DISCOVERY AND THEREBY WAIVED ALL RIGHTS ON
APPEAL.
The City agrees that it had a duty to provide the appellant discovery in response to his

discovery request. See Utah R. Crim. P. 16, R. at 4. The City is unsure as"to why its response to
appellant's request for discovery was delayed until June 5,1998. The City recognizes its
unintentional error but disagrees that it is reversible, prejudicial error. Indeed, had the appellant
felt prejudiced as a result of the City's unintentional error, he could have availed himself of the
statutorily prescribed remedies.
If the rules of discovery have not been complied with, Rule 16(g) provides several
remedies.
If at any time during the course of the proceedings it is brought to the attention of the
Court that a party has failed to comply with this rule, the Court may order such party to
permit the discovery or inspection, grant a continuance, or prohibit the party from
introducing evidence not disclosed, or it may enter such other order as it deems just under
the circumstances.
Utah R. Crim P. 16(g)
Appellant never brought to the attention of the trial Court that he had not received his
requested discovery. Had he done so, the Court would have been able to fashion an appropriate
remedy. This Court has clearly stated that when the prosecution introduces unexpected
testimony, a defendant:
'essentially' waive[s] his right to later claim error' if the defendant fails to request
a continuance or seek other appropriate relief under Rule 16(g). State v. Larson,
775 P.2d 415,418 (Utah 1989). See also State v. Griffiths, 752 P.2d 879, 883
(Utah 1988) (holding that, by failing to move for continuance, 'defendant waived

8

relief under rule 16(g)... by not making timely efforts to mitigate or eliminate
the prejudice caused by the prosecutor's conduct'.)
State v. Rugebregt, 965 P. 2d 518, 522 (Utah App. 1998)
In State v. Christofferson, 793 P.2d 944 (Utah App. 1990), defendant was presented with
unexpected testimony at trial. He "had several avenues available to him to"mitigate the effects of
the unanticipated testimony. However, he did not object, move for a continuance, or request a
mistrial." See Id. By failing to seek any of these remedies, he was precluded from claiming
error. See Id. at 947-48.
When appellant appeared for trial, he did not object to the City's failure to provide
discovery. Just as the defendant erred in Rugebregt by not requesting a continuance, appellant
did not request a continuance. See Rugebregt at 522. When the City's two witnesses were
called, appellant did not object to their testimony. Like the defendant in Rugebregt, by failing to
make a timely request for a continuance or any other relief provided under Rule 16, appellant
waived his right of relief. See Id.
In Salt Lake City v. Reynolds, 849 P.2d 582 (Utah app. 1993), as cited by appellant, the
prosecution failed to provide defense counsel with the criminal history of one of the
prosecution's witnesses. On appeal, the state attempted to argue that defense counsel should
have moved to compel discovery. This Court stated that such an argument was "misplaced." See
Id. at 585. This Court stated that the prosecution's failure to provide the criminal history
erroneously led defense counsel to believe that the witness did not have a criminal history and
thus defendant did not have a duty to compel discovery. See Id. That is not the case before this
Court. Appellant did not receive any discovery from the City. This is entirely different from the
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case in Reynolds. See Id. Knowing that an investigation had been completed1 and presumably a
report written, appellant should have filed a motion to compel discovery or at the very least,
notified the Court that he did not receive his requested discovery. Appellant chose to do nothing
and therefore waived his right of appeal. See Rugebregt at 947-48.
If the Court determines that appellant did not waive his rights under Rule 16, then
appellant must show that had the discovery been provided to him, a more favorable result would
have occurred. See Reynolds at 585. Appellant was well acquainted with the charges and facts,
and was fully prepared for trial, as evidenced by his preparation in calling two witnesses to rebut
the testimony of the City's two witnesses.
Appellant's witness, Michael Duane Edwards (hereinafter referred to as "Edwards"), was
present when Ms. Leach told appellant to turn down his music and presented testimony rebutting
Ms. Leach's version of the incident. R. at 59 (Tr. at 27, 6). Edwards also accompanied appellant
on the ice-covered pool incident and could have offered rebuttal testimony had he been asked. R.
at 59 (Tr. at 7) Edwards was asked questions about the laser pointer, the rifle, appellant's
background, and the allegations that appellant had killed people in the past as well as appellant's
reputation for peacefulness. R. at 59 (Tr. at 28-31). Edwards was prepared to rebut most, if not
all the allegations made by Ms. Leach.
Appellant's next witness, Scott Cutler, (hereinafter referred to as "Cutler") also
accompanied appellant and Edwards during the ice-covered pool incident. R. at 59 (Tr. at 49).
Cutler was asked about appellant's rifle, any alleged threats made towards Ms. Leach, as well as

1

Appellant had been interviewed by the police about this case. Appellant then returned
to the apartment complex "to talk to a potential witness." R. at 58 (Tr. at 10.)
10

appellant's reputation for peacefulness. He too was called to rebut the allegations made by the
City's witnesses.
The appellant did not, and cannot show that had the City provided him with the
discovery, he would have received of a more favorable result at trial. His two witnesses were
fully prepared to rebut the testimony offered by the City. Had he not called any witnesses, his
allegation that the City's error prejudiced him might be supported. However, appellant was
prepared for trial'despite not having received his discovery. Therefore appellant cannot show
that he would have received a more favorable result had he been provided a copy of the
discovery. Accordingly, any relief should be denied. See Reynolds at 585.

III.

THE CITY CONDUCTED PROPER CROSS-EXAMINATION OF THE
APPELLANT'S WITNESSES.
"In all cases in which evidence of character or a trait of character of a person is

admissible, proof may be made by testimony as to reputation or by testimony in the form of an
opinion. On cross-examination, inquiry is allowable into relevant specific instances of conduct."
Utah R. Evid. 405. In a stalking case, appellant's character for peacefulness is relevant.
Appellant attempted to lay the foundation and elicit from both his witnesses his reputation for
peacefulness. R. at 59 (Tr. at 29-31, 34, 35). When appellant was attempting to establish his
peaceful reputation through Edwards, the City clearly indicated that it would request a
continuance2 in order to prepare to rebut these allegations. During the requested five minute
2

"Mr. Church: If he does that I'm going to ask for a recess because I've got a whole list
of people that would be willing to come in and testify that Mr. Bergstrom's been stalking them
(inaudible) other type behavior." . . . "As I said, your honor, if we go there then I'm going to ask
for a continuance so I can bring in some more witnesses." R. at 59 (Tr. at 29).
11

recess prior to cross-examination of Cutler, R at 59 (Tr. at 35), the City was able to confer with
Cameron, who had already testified, and another possible witness, who was present in Court and
who had relevant information regarding specific instances of conduct on the part of appellant as
well as his reputation for peacefulness.
It would have been improper for the City to present this type of specific acts evidence
during its case in chief "The State may not show defendant's prior trouble with the law, specific
criminal acts, or ill name among his neighbors, even though such facts might logically be
persuasive that he is by propensity a probable perpetrator of the crime." Michelson v. United
States, 355 U.S. 469,476 (1948). Character evidence is generally inadmissable except when
offered "by an accused, or by the prosecution to rebut the same." Utah R. Evid. 404(a)(1).
Accordingly, the only time the City could have introduced character evidence through direct
testimony would be in its rebuttal case, which it chose not to present. Rather, the City chose to
cross-examine Cutler regarding specific instances of conduct after Cutler stated, "Yes,
[appellant] does have a reputation for being peaceable." R. at 59 (Tr. at 34).
At that point, appellant chose to inject his character for peacefulness into the trial. Once
he offered evidence of his pertinent character trait for peacefulness to show that he was not
guilty, "his claim of possession of these traits - but only these traits - is open to rebuttal by crossexamination or direct testimony of prosecution witnesses." John William Strong et al.,
McCormick on Evidence § 191 at 348 (4th ed. 1992).
The price a defendant must pay for attempting to prove his good name is to throw
open the entire subject which the law has kept closed for his benefit, and to make
himself vulnerable where the law otherwise shields him. The prosecution may
pursue the inquiry with contradictory witnesses to show that damaging rumors,
whether or not well grounded, were afloat - - for it is not the man that he is, but
12

the name that he has, which is put in issue. Another hazard is that his own
witness is subject to cross-examination as to the contents and extent of the hearsay
on which he bases his conclusions...
Michelson at 479.
The City acknowledges that it must have a good faith basis to believe that certain
incidents occurred before asking about them on cross-examination. The City had spoken with
the witnesses in this case as well as other people who knew appellant. Each of these people
confirmed all or part of the incidents about which Cutler was cross-examined. The City alluded
to this fact when it informed the Court that it would be requesting time to confer with its
witnesses, and did so during the recess. R at 59. (Tr. at 29). Further, the City, in its summation,
again informed the Court that it would be able to present evidence regarding the appellant's
reputation for peacefulness.3
Appellant cites In the Matter ofGMP.,

909 S.W.2d 198 (Tex. App. 1995) stating that

failure to lay a factual foundation to establish a good faith basis for questions regarding specific
instances of conduct is reversible error. Appellant, then cites additional cases for the same or
similar holding. See State v. Palmer, 860 P.2d 339 (Utah App. 1993), cert, denied, 868 P.2d 95
(Utah 1993) , Gayle v. Scully, 779 F.2d 802 (2d. Cir 1985), White v. State, 448 S.2d. 970 (Ala.
Crim. App. 1984). However, these additional cases deal with issues different than the one
presented to this Court. While the City may not have proffered the factual basis at the time of
3

MR. CHURCH: " . . . the City would proffer that they could put on witnesses who - some are here in Court today, and as I said, I would be able to call other witnesses that would be
able to testify that the defendant in fact does not have a reputation for peacefulness... As well
the City would proffer that if Mr. Cameron were to retake the stand he would testify that he was
present when Mr. Cutler and Mr. Edwards and the defendant engaged in harassing behavior and
saw the defendant get up in Mr. Adamson's face and pin him up in a comer." R. at 59 (Tr. at 4950).
13

cross-examination, it did provide the Court with a proffer to support at least one of the incidents
in it's summation. R. at 59 (Tr. at 49-50).
In Palmer4 and Gayle v. Scully,5 the improper questioning involved questioning of the
accused on cross-examination and in White,6 the cross-examination was of a witness, but none of
these cases dealt with the issue of cross-examination of a witness who had testified regarding the
reputation of the accused.
Finally, "[fjailure to object to the improper remarks, however, waives the claim unless the
remarks reach the level of plain error. Normally, wefindplain error only if we conclude: an
error exists, it should have been obvious to the trial Court, and it was harmful." Palmer at 342.
Appellant failed to object to the questioning, therefore he waived his claim on appeal. If the
Court determines, however, that a pro se defendant cannot waive such a claim, the Court will see
that a "plain error" has not occurred. See Id.
The City committed no error in cross-examining appellant's witnesses regarding specific
instances of conduct after they testified regarding appellant's reputation for peacefulness. See
Utah R. Evid. 405. Such cross-examination was in harmony with the trial Court's statement,
"Well, then you can cross examine on specific instances and ask him if he's aware of those.
That's what the statute provides." R. at 59 (Tr. at 35).

4
5

Palmer at 343.
Gayle v. Scully, 779 F.2d 802 (2d. Cir. 1985) Note: Appellant citing to dissenting

opinion.
6

White v. State, 448 S.2d 970 (Ala. Crim. App. 1984)
14

The City had a good faith basis on which to cross-examine appellant's witnesses.
Because appellant's reputation for peacefulness is based on hearsay,7 a summarization of what is
heard in the community, it is only logical that cross-examination will include a summarization of
what others have heard about the appellant in the community, as relayed to the prosecutor. The
City then proceeded to cross-examine appellant's witnesses. The City properly cross-examined
appellant's witnesses. Therefore, no error was committed.

IV.

THERE IS NO ISSUE OF CUMULATIVE ERROR
Because the City has refuted each of appellant's alleged errors, there can be no

cumulative error. Therefore appellant's argument requesting reversal of his conviction based on
a theory of cumulative error, fails.

CONCLUSION
Appellant would have this Court find numerous evidentiary and procedural errors and
grant appellant a new trial. However, upon close examination of the facts and the law as applied
to this case, the Court will find that if any errors were committed, they were harmless. Further,
appellant has failed to show any prejudice to himself or how, absent any alleged errors, there is a
reasonable likelihood that he would have received a more favorable result at trial. For these

7

When the defendant elects to initiate a character inquiry...[n]ot only is he permitted to
call witnesses to testify from hearsay, but indeed such a witness is not allowed to base his
testimony on anything but hearsay. Michelson at 478.
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reasons, appellant's request for a reversal of his conviction and a remand for a new trial should
be denied.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 25th day of June, 1999.

ROBERT J. CHURCH
Orem City Prosecutor
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that I mailed two trae and correct copies of the foregoing Appellee's
Brief, postage prepaid, this 25th day of June, 1999, to the following:
GREGORY G. SKORDAS
BRETT J. DELPORTO
Attorneys for Appellant
111 East Broadway, Suite 800
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111-2304
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ADDENDUM

Defendant's Name

Defendant's Address

City, State & Zip

Telephone

IN THE

JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

STATE OF UTAH
Plaintiff,

AFFIDAVIT OF INDIGENCY
Case No.

vs.

Judee
Defendant.

Defendant provides the following information required by Utah Code Section 77-32-LI:
DEFENDANT'S FINANCIAL INFORMATION

Fill out the following table completely.
Monthly Net Income

Employer's
Name & Address

Alimony received
Child Support received
Income in the past 12 months from any other non-governmental source including business, profession or other
self-employment; rent payments; interest or dividends; pensions, annuities, or life insurance payments; gifts or
inheritance
Income from government financial support including social security benefits, AFDC, worker's compensation,
veterans noneducational benefits, housing, food, or other living allowances paid to members of the military,
clergy, and others.

1

Monthly Gross Income

1

[f Defendant is currently not employed:

Date & state of last employment
Salary/wages per month when last employed

Amounts in cash or in any bank accounts including savings and checking
Amounts owing to Defendant including accounts receivable

List of home, land or other real property and vehicles or other personal property owned in whole or in part by
Defendant, its location and its approximate value. Include any real or personal property which Defendant has
transferred to a third party since the date of the offense alleged in the information.
Property

Location

Value

List of Defendant's debts.
To whom owed

To whom owed

Amount

Amount

List of Defendant's monthly expenses.
Amount

Amount

j

Food

Gas

Clothing

Water

Transportation

Sewer

Mortgage/rent

Car Payments

Electricity

Medical
Payments

Amount
Other (list)

2

DEFENDANT'S DEPENDENTS.
Name

Age

Name

Relationship

Age

Relationship

STATE OF UTAH
)ss
COUNTY OF
Being sworn, I state that I,
_, am the Defendant; that
I have read this Affidavit and the statements in it are true and correct to the best of my
knowledge; and that due to my poverty I am unable to bear the expenses of hiring an
attorney to defend myself in this proceeding.

(Signature of Defendant)

Subscribed and sworn before me on.

NOTARY PUBLIC
My Commission Expires
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ORDER ON AFFIDAVIT OF INDIGENCY
(To be filled out by the judge)
THE COURT HEREBY incorporates the facts set out in the Defendant's Affidavit of
Indigency, with any modifications indicated verbally on the court record- or written below; and
finds as follows:
Defendant is indigent.
Defendant is not indigent.
Modifications, if any:

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED:
Under Utah Code Title 77, Chapter 32,
appointed to represent Defendant in the above referenced case.
Under Utah Code Title 77, Chapter 32, Defendant is not entitled to appointed
defense counsel in the above referenced case.

DATED this

day of

, 19.

BY THE COURT:

DISTRICT COURT JUDGE
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